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30 Years Later: The World Court Project

July 7, 2026
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IPPNW Co-President Ron McCoy and President of IALANA Peter Weiss in the Peace Palace, waiting for the oral proceedings to begin, 30 October 1995. Photo: Xanthe Hall

Tomorrow, on 8 July, the Advisory Opinion on the legality of nuclear weapons will be thirty years old. What did the World Court Project change? This is the second part of a three-part series looking at what led up to the Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice in The Hague in 1996, and what it meant for the process towards complete nuclear disarmament.

The World Court Project

Officially launched by IPPNW, IALANA and IPB, the World Court Project set out with the aim of getting the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in The Hague to review the legal status of the use of nuclear weapons, in particular with a view to their effects on health and the environment.

However, the idea of reviewing the (il)legality of nuclear weapons’ use originated in the 1980s in New Zealand. Retired judge Harold Evans was considered to be the ‘father’ of the project. In March 1987 he personally delivered open letters to the Prime Ministers of New Zealand and Australia, asking them to initiate an action that would lead to an Advisory Opinion by the ICJ [Dewes 2006].

IPPNW focussed on the World Health Organisation (WHO), pursuing the idea of following on from the WHO study on the “Effects of Nuclear War on Health and Health Services”. After intense lobbying, on 14 May 1993, the World Health Assembly (WHA) passed a historic resolution mandating the WHO to ask the ICJ to advise as to the legal status of the use of nuclear weapons. On 27 August 1993, the Director-General of the WHO, Dr. Hiroshi Nakajima, sent the following question to the ICJ:

“In view of the health and environmental effects, would the use of nuclear weapons by a State in war or any other armed conflict be a breach of its obligations under international law, including the Constitution of the World Health Organisation?” [WHA 1993]

While IPPNW was concentrating on the health angle, IALANA was pushing for a UN General Assembly resolution. This took a little longer, but was equally successful: on 14 December 1994 the vote was carried by the non-aligned states (78 in favour, 43 against, and 38 abstentions), calling for an ICJ advisory opinion [UNGA 1994]. This was the UN put their ‘urgent’ request to the ICJ:

“Is the threat or use of nuclear weapons in any circumstance permitted under international law?” [UNSG 1994]

It was not the work of these two organisations alone that achieved these two first goals, but a massive network of over 500 organisations worldwide. In the UK, Canada and New Zealand World Court Project coalitions sprang up. The UK Project introduced the idea of a “Declaration of Public Conscience” – the brainchild of George Farebrother, a retired history schoolteacher who was unstoppable in his fervour to collect millions of declarations [Green, 2015]. The concept of the “Declaration of Public Conscience” originated with the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907 that contained the so-called de Martens clause. This established the idea that, in cases where the law is unclear, the “laws of humanity and the requirements of the public conscience” should decide [Ticehurst].

The ICJ took both questions together and called on UN member states to submit written and oral statements. The World Court Project put pressure on governments to make a statement and 44 countries responded by doing so [ICJ 1995 (1)].

Oral proceedings

The court also called on states to come to the court and deliver statements orally. 25 states planned on speaking, but three of them bowed to pressure and backed out at the last minute: Columbia, Guyana, and Nauru, although they had been amongst the strongest supporters of the WCP.

The oral proceedings took place from 30 October to 15 November 1995. Non-governmental Organisations were permitted to attend the oral proceedings, and we did so – in large numbers. As I entered the courtroom in the Peace Palace, facing the long table at which the 14 judges were to sit was a big crowd. The media filled much of the rest of the space, cameras at the ready. The judges filed in, taking their seats, and the proceedings began.

The first was the representative of the WHO, explaining why it was justified in asking the court a question on nuclear weapons and why it was part of their remit as a health organisation. The nuclear weapons states called the admissibility of the application to the ICJ into question. The WHO countered, detailing the work they had done on the prevention of nuclear war, as a health issue. [Vignes 1995]

Australia’s representatives, including Foreign Minister Gareth Evans, argued that while nuclear weapons are “by their nature illegal under customary international law, by virtue of fundamental general principles of humanity. It is illegal not only to use or threaten use of nuclear weapons, but to acquire, develop, test or possess them. The right of States to self-defence cannot be invoked to justify such actions.” Despite these fine words, Australia pleaded for the question to be rejected as inadmissible in fear of the court finding in favour of legality. This was, indeed, a widely-held concern that the Project had discussed in great depth before embarking on the campaign for an advisory opinion [Griffith, Evans 1995].

The Egyptian representative cited a Swahili saying “when the elephants fight, it is the grass that suffers”. He asked for “clarification from the Court as to the legal limits of the freedom of the elephants”. Although this would be a “mere legal pronouncement, a kind of legal determination”, it would put into motion a process in the same way as the first Advisory Opinion on the status of South West Africa that took 40 years to make itself felt [Abi-Saab 1995].

The director of the law department of the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Dr. Hartmut Hillgenberg, argued that “nuclear deterrence as adapted over time has proved successful in preserving peace and freedom”, a highly political statement. He went on to argue that the question could only be answered politically, and not legally, and an Opinion would “overstep the bounds of the Court’s function”, or even “jeopardize the complex and sensitive process of negotiating nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation” [Hillgenberg 1995].

Originally supposed to represent Japan were the Mayors of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. This had been made possible by enormous civil society pressure within Japan. While the oral proceedings took place, during a parallel NGO seminar for the World Court Project, it was reported that the two Mayors had received clear instructions to plead in favour of illegality, without using the word “illegality”. The government wanted the court to argue that the use of nuclear weapons under unforeseen circumstances could be legal. The Mayors did not follow these instructions and, as a consequence, the Japanese government distanced themselves from the statement. The judges were visibly moved by the descriptions given by the Mayors of the effects of nuclear weapons on the populations of the two atomic bombed cities [Hiraoka, Itoh 1995].

The Marshall Islands sent nuclear test survivor Lijon Eknilang of Rongelap Atoll with the most shocking and upsetting statement on the effects of US testing on Bikini:

“I have had miscarriages on seven occasions. On one of those occasions, I miscarried after four months. The child I miscarried was severely deformed; it had only one eye. (…) many of my friends keep quiet about the strange births they had. In privacy, they give birth, not to children as we like to think of them, but to things we could only describe as “octopuses”, “apples”, “turtles”, and other things in our experience. We do not have Marshallese words for these kinds of babies because they were never born before the radiation came. (…) The most common birth defects on Rongelap and nearby islands have been “jellyfish” babies. These babies are born with no bones in their bodies and with transparent skin. We can see their brains and hearts beating. The babies usually live for a day or two before they stop breathing.” [Eknilang, 1995]

Altogether 22 states and the WHO gave oral statements, 13 of which spoke in favour of illegality. Australia and Japan stayed on the sidelines. France, the United States, Great Britain, and Russia refused to entertain any legal intervention in nuclear affairs, it being a political question that – in France’s opinion — only the Security Council could deal with. Germany and Italy were the sycophants of the nuclear powers, and China kept its opinion to themselves.

The Opinion

Much has been written about the Advisory Opinion itself, which was published on 8 July 1996. A factual summary of its contents can be found in Part 1. There are suggestions for further reading on both the Opinion and the World Court Project at the end of this article.

In the Opinion, the judges explain why they rejected the WHO question (by a vote 11-3) and declined to give an opinion on it, stating although it constituted a ‘legal question’, despite the political considerations involved, the question itself did not lie within the scope of WHO’s competence, as defined by its Constitution. Further reading on this convoluted argumentation can be found below [MPI].

As I recall, at first opinion on the Opinion was divided into more or less three camps:

  • Those who argued that the majority decision that the threat or use of nuclear weapons would generally be contrary to the rules of international law was a win for the nuclear disarmament movement, as the Court could not decide under which circumstances, if any, they might be considered to be legal.
  • Those that argued that the Court had failed to definitively answer the question by leaving what might be considered by some as a ‘loophole’.
  • Those that argued that the threat or use in a “extreme circumstance of self-defence, in which the very survival of a State would be at stake” could not be considered as unlawful, given that the Court could not decide.

Indeed, the strongest evidence of the Opinion changing policy could be seen in the Russian military doctrine which stated that nuclear weapons would only be used if the ‘survival of the state was at stake’ [Russian Federation 2014]. Since the war on Ukraine, the question has been put many times as to what the ‘survival of the state’ entails. This is not defined in the Advisory Opinion and is open to interpretation.

All that remains is to comment on the question that has plagued us ever since: what did the Advisory Opinion bring in the way of change? Tomorrow, on the day of the anniversary, part 3 will cover that question.

Sources and further reading

Dewes, Kate: The World Court Project. The Evolution and Impact of an Effective Citizens’ Movement, University of New England, Christchurch, Aotearoa/New Zealand, Oct 1998 (PDF) https://cdn.prod.website-files.com/5b43f3f705b1ce380ccbdaed/5bfb50a1ca7e4d0c34a34ec7_Dr%20Dewes%20PhD%20WCP-compressed.pdf

Dewes, Kate: Obituary for Harold Evans, Peace Researcher, Easter 2006 (PDF) https://legacy.disarmsecure.org/Harold%20Evans%20Obituary%20for%20CAFCA.pdf

Green, Rob: George Farebrother obituary, The Guardian, 24 Mar 2015 https://www.theguardian.com/theguardian/2015/mar/24/george-farebrother-obituary

ICJ (1): Written proceedings, International Court of Justice, 18 May – 20 Sep 1995 https://www.icj-cij.org/case/95/written-proceedings

ICJ (2): Oral Statements, verbatim records, International Court of Justice, 30 Oct – 15 Nov 1995 https://www.icj-cij.org/case/95/oral-statements

MPI: World Court Digest: III. The International Court of Justice, 5. Advisory Opinions of the International Court of Justice, 5.3. Jurisdictional Questions and Denial of the Request for Advisory Opinion, Advisory Opinion Legality of the Use by a State of Nuclear Weapons in Armed Conflict (Request by WHO) Advisory Opinion of 8 July 1996, I.C.J. Reports 1996, p.66, Max-Planck-Institut für ausländisches öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht, no date given, accessed on 5 July 2026. https://www.mpil.de/de/pub/publikationen/archiv/world-court-digest.cfm

Russian Federation: The Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation, 25 Dec 2014, english translation (PDF), “27. The Russian Federation shall reserve the right to use nuclear weapons in response to the use of nuclear and other types of weapons of mass destruction against it and/or its allies, as well as in the event of aggression against the Russian Federation with the use of conventional weapons when the very existence of the state is in jeopardy”. Russian Military and Security Research Group. https://rusmilsec.blog/wp-content/uploads/2021/08/mildoc_rf_2014_eng.pdf

Ticehurst, Rupert: The Martens Clause and the Laws of Armed Conflict, International Institute of Humanitarian Law Online Resource Library (PDF), no date given, accessed on 6 July 2026

https://www.onlinelibrary.iihl.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/07/Martens-Clause-LOAC.pdf

UNGA: Request for an advisory opinion from the International Court of Justice on the legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons, in Resolutions adopted by the General Assembly, A/RES/49/75, 15 Dec 1994 p 15 https://docs.un.org/en/A/RES/49/75

UNGA: Taking forward multilateral nuclear disarmament negotiations, UN General Assembly Resolution A/RES/70/33, 7 Dec 2015 https://docs.un.org/en/A/RES/70/33

UNSG: Request for Advisory Opinion, Legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, UN Secretary-General, 19 Dec 1994 (PDF) https://www.icj-cij.org/sites/default/files/case-related/95/7646.pdf

WHA: Health and Environmental Effects of Nuclear Weapons, Resolution WHA46.40, 14 May 1993, in ICJ: Legality of the Use by a State of Nuclear Weapons in Armed Conflict: Vol. I, pp 6-9 UN iLibrary, Apr 2022 https://www.un-ilibrary.org/content/books/9789210014298c002

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