How Finland learned to love the bomb

by Kati Juva

When Finland’s defence minister Antti Häkkänen announced on 5 March that Finland will lift its ban on nuclear weapons, it was a total surprise to all opposition parties and also to most MPs from the government parties, not to mention the civil society. The proposal had been prepared in total secrecy and went against previous promises. 

Finland has traditionally been regarded as a country supporting détente and nuclear disarmament. In the 1970s our president, Urho Kekkonen, actively promoted a nuclear-free Nordic region. Since 1987, Finland has had a paragraph in the Nuclear Energy Act prohibiting the import, manufacturing, possession, and exploding of nuclear weapons in Finland. The background for this prohibition was the Agreement on Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual assistance we had with the Soviet Union from 1948 up to the collapse of Soviet Union. This agreement included a possibility, that if someone were to attack the Soviet Union through Finnish territory, the Soviets could defend themselves on Finnish soil together with the Finns. The nuclear ban act was to guarantee that the Soviets could not bring nuclear weapons into Finland in any such situations.

For decades Finland stayed militarily non-aligned, even though we approached the West step-by-step by joining the EU and other economic organisations. Before the Russian attack against Ukraine in 2022, a vast majority of Finns opposed Finland joining NATO.   

The general opinion changed nearly overnight after the Russian attack. The nation got a collective déjà vu from the Winter War in 1939, when the Soviet Union attacked Finland. The gut feeling was “never alone anymore.” In 2022, more than 85% of Finns supported joining NATO. The dread of Russia is a strong undercurrent in Finland. 

So, Finland joined NATO in 2023. And as new members often tend to, Finland is acting as a model pupil. Our military has been excited to join NATO’s nuclear planning group and to take part in the nuclear exercise Steadfast noon. Finland has strong conventional defences, and our modern fighters can serve as “support for nuclear operations with conventional air tactics (SNOWCAT).”

Finland also signed a defence cooperation agreement (DCA) with the US in 2024. This gives the US free access to 15 bases. Finnish law does not apply at these bases, and the US military can come and go as they wish. They can also bring any kind of equipment there without declaring it in customs.

As everywhere in Europe, militarism is also increasing in Finland. The Russian attack and President Trump’s talks about withdrawing the US from the defence of Europe has increased the discourse about Europe’s own means of deterrence, both conventional and nuclear.

When NATO membership and the DCA agreement were discussed, many politicians and civil society activists expressed their concern about how these agreements relate to nuclear weapons. We were assured several times that there is no need for any reservations for nuclear weapons, as our legislation unequivocally prohibits nukes. 

For some years there has been a process to renew the Nuclear Energy Act. Amendments are related to updating the regulations for nuclear energy to be compatible with possible small modular nuclear power plants. During the process the government has always declared there is no need to change the paragraph concerning nuclear weapons, and it has been unchanged in all previous drafts. In Spring 2025, our prime minister, Petteri Orpo, assured publicly that the nuclear ban would remain in the new bill. 

Thus, it came totally out of blue when Minister Häkkänen announced the plans to lift the ban. The Conservative Party happens to have a ‘straight flush’ in the government—president, prime minister, minister of foreign affairs and minister of defence—so there was no formal need to consult other parties. Nonetheless, the procedure deviated clearly from Finland’s very long tradition to arrive at foreign and security policy through consensus between the government and the opposition. The timetable was also exceptionally fast: very little time for formal statements or discussion in the parliament and in the civil society.  This approach brought about a great uproar and may have broken permanently the way foreign policy is conducted in Finland.

But of course, the content of the bill is the main problem. 

The government has been trying to alleviate the change by announcing there will not be permanent stationing of nuclear weapons, at least during peace time. There are, however, no restrictions on transfer. And even the possibility of having nuclear weapons in Finland will increase the tension in the area and strengthen Russia’s feeling of being surrounded by enemies. This will probably lead to an accelerating arms race in the Kola peninsula.

One of the blind spots in the bill is that now, when prohibition of nuclear weapons is lifted, there are no reservations for the US to bring nuclear weapons into their bases in Finland. We have given our sovereignty to another country. Finland would probably be consulted, but there is no legal obstruction for the US to bring nukes here if they wish.

A similar position applies to the French Advanced Nuclear Deterrent. It is hardly a coincidence that minister Häkkänen’s proposal came four days after French President Macrón’s speech on France’s new nuclear doctrine. Finland obviously wants to join this initiative, and the government has assessed it would be easier if we don’t have legislation prohibiting nuclear weapons. Of course, the French will keep strict control of the use of the weapons—but will possibly make us pay.

By lifting the nuclear ban, the government is making Finland less safe. Deterrence works on ambiguity. One of Macrón’s ideas is, that during a crisis, French nuclear weapons could be stationed in the territory of allies. Thus, all bases which could possibly hold nuclear weapons (French or American) will be considered as targets by the adversary. Finland would become a target.  

Lifting the nuclear ban also gives a wrong message to the world: that Finland believes in deterrence and that nuclear weapons will make Finland safer. If Finland thinks like this, why should not Egypt, Saudi-Arabia, South Korea, or Japan also reason that having nuclear weapons will increase their security.  Finland’s decision is not fundamentally against the  Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) but undermines the already frail NPT and the arms control architecture. This could lead to nuclear proliferation. 

All of this is part of the dangerous trend of normalising nuclear weapons in international relations.

Discussion in Finland

When the proposal to lift the ban of nuclear weapons was made public, all the opposition parties and the civil society were taken by surprise. Three of the opposition parties, The Greens, the Social Democratic Party, and the Left Alliance quickly formulated a position against the new bill. The Centre Party, which is also in the opposition, was irritated by the procedure, but kept a low profile concerning the content of the bill.

ICAN Finland and other peace and human rights organisations began a campaign: “No nuclear weapons to Finland.”  We wrote statements and contacted and met parliamentarians. There were demonstrations, debates, and events with high-level speakers (peace researchers, legal and military experts and politicians). We established a petition to the government.

The webpage of ICAN Finland was updated with a lot of material about the humanitarian impacts of nuclear weapons, the insecurity of deterrence, and the dangers of nuclear proliferation and the arms race. We produced podcasts, short videos, and posts to social media (Facebook, Instagram). ICAN Finland’s social media coverage grew many-fold, and we got many new followers. International ICAN’s Florian Eblenkamp came to Finland and helped us in many ways.

ICAN also conducted a poll about nuclear weapons in Finland. Only 18% of Finns agreed with the question “would you support any other country deploying nuclear weapons to Finland?” 58% were against. 

We fought hard, and the awareness of nuclear weapons grew a lot, but alas, on 17 June, the parliament voted on the bill and accepted it. 125 for, 61 against. The Greens, the Social Democrats, and the Left Alliance voted against it unanimously, but the Centre party supported it as did all the MPs of the government parties.  

The result is both very sad and very dangerous for Finland and for the whole world. 

Dr. Kati Juva is IPPNW co-president and ICAN Finland coordinator.