Greenland, nuclear weapons, and global security

by Kati Juva

US President Donald Trump is obsessed with Greenland. Fortunately, his demands to possess the semi-autonomous territory of Denmark by hook or by crook have calmed down, at least for a while. Trump has justified his demands by invoking US national security needs, but we all know that his ego, his desire to dominate the Western hemisphere, and the rare minerals under the island’s soil are the real reasons.  Denmark’s agreements with the US already allow the American military to do nearly whatever they wish in Greenland.

There is, though, a category of weapons the US cannot deploy onto Denmark’s territory, namely nuclear weapons. While American nuclear weapons are currently deployed in Belgium, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, and Turkey under NATO’s highly contentious nuclear-sharing programme,  Denmark prohibits nuclear weapons on its territory. 

Is the Trump administration dreaming of deploying nuclear weapons in Greenland, which would require ownership of the territory?

Actually, Denmark’s official prohibition of nuclear weapons on its territory has not prevented the US from deploying them in Greenland in the past. In the 1960s there were nuclear weapons at the US base in Thule (now Pituffik). At that time, the capability for a US nuclear attack was based on B52 bombers patrolling continuously in the air. Were US ground bases destroyed by a “preventive” nuclear strike, the bombers would carry their deadly cargo to the enemy. At the Thule base, there was always one bomber patrolling in the air above Greenland and the Arctic Ocean near the former-Soviet border.

Neither the Danish government nor the Folketinget (parliament) ever gave official permission for this arrangement, but several prime ministers and other politicians were aware of what was happening and turned a blind eye. This was not revealed until the end of 1990s, when it created a scandal. 

There was also a catastrophic nuclear weapons accident at the Thule base in January 1968, which could have resulted in a nuclear war.

On a polar night at -30°C, a fire broke out in a cabin of a bomber carrying several nuclear weapons. The fire began when a heating device ignited some foam rubber installed for warmth and comfort. The crew, unable to extinguish it, turned back towards the base, then parachuted from the plane, which crashed on sea ice about 12 miles from the Thule base. The plutonium triggers of the bombs exploded, and radioactive plutonium was spread over a vast area. Luckily there was no actual nuclear explosion. The fire continued for six hours. Hot pieces melted the ice, sank, and then froze again. One of the bombs was never found; it probably melted though the ice and is now at the bottom of the Arctic Ocean. 

There was a possibility for an enormously greater catastrophe. At that time the only communication from the Thule base came by radio signals from the base itself. In the command-and-control chain there was an assumption that if the Thule base went quiet it would probably mean a missile attack on the base. If the burning B52 had hit the Thule base (where it was heading) instead of crashing on the ice, it could have destroyed the base altogether. Thule would have fallen silent, and this could have been interpreted as a Soviet missile attack. The response could have been a counterstrike against the Soviet Union, precipitating a nuclear war.

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In the past couple of weeks, a few regional politicians have begun floating  the notion of  Nordic or Arctic nuclear weapons. Some European leaders panicked when Trump threatened to withdraw US military protection from Europe. In Sweden, Denmark, Norway, and Finland there has been suggestions about a joint Nordic nuclear bomb. This would be a very dangerous development. Any increase of nuclear arsenals in the Arctic—whether by NATO’s sharing programme or by a separate Nordic bomb—would increase the tension in the area tremendously. It would lead to a nuclear arms race and unquestionably provoke Russia into deploying more nuclear weapons in the Kola peninsula. 

More nuclear weapons in the Arctic (or anywhere)—especially in the current tense international atmosphere, increases the risk they will be used—either unintentionally or due to a provocation. 

We do not want nuclear weapons in the Arctic or anywhere. We need communication, negotiations, arms control, and—ultimately—universal participation in the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons leading to their total elimination. Until then, let’s keep the Arctic nuclear free.

Kati Juva is Co-President of IPPNW and coordinator of ICAN-Finland.