Nuclear testing, safety, and security

by Kati Juva

The world got alarmed at the end of October when US president Trump ordered the US to resume nuclear tests, ostensibly because China and Russia have been testing. In fact, neither China nor Russia has conducted a nuclear test explosion in decades—Russia declared a unilateral moratorium in 1991 and China has not tested since at least 1996. A global seismic and satellite surveillance system makes it virtually impossible to explode a nuclear warhead undetected. 

Trump’s administration rushed to explain that the president only meant testing missiles and vehicles capable of carrying nuclear weapons. This is of course something nuclear weapons states, including the US, are doing all the time. Russia just tested its new cruise missile, Burevestnik, which can change its course during flight and is very difficult to detect. Meanwhile the US is developing different stealth fighters and unmanned aircrafts. 

Should the US really start nuclear tests, it would lead to a vast escalation in the nuclear arms race and would make the world increasingly dangerous and unsafe. President Putin has already declared that Russia is ready to resume nuclear tests in Novaya Zemlya, if necessary. China has reaffirmed its commitment to the testing moratorium, but has also reportedly expanded its test site at Lop Nor.

Nuclear tests are very hazardous to the environment and to all living creatures. Local destruction is vast and even from underground tests there can be (and has been) radioactive leakage to the atmosphere. IPPNW has released a strong statement condemning Trump’s new nuclear testing order.

There have been around 2,000 nuclear tests since the Trinity test 80 years ago— more than 500 of those in the atmosphere. It has been estimated that the radioactivity from these tests has caused over half-a-million surplus cancer deaths all around the world.

Atmospheric tests were prohibited in 1963 and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) prohibiting all nuclear testing was negotiated in 1996. China and the US have signed but not ratified the CTBT, and Russia withdrew its ratification in 2023.  India and Pakistan conducted nuclear tests in 1998, but since then they have declared their intention to conform with the treaty, though they have not signed it. North Korea is the only country which has performed nuclear tests in the 2000s, the latest being in 2017. 

Even if the nuclear arms states do not resume nuclear tests, the ongoing modernization of missiles, fighters, and command and control systems is accelerating the global nuclear arms race. Nuclear weapons states believe they would benefit from more sophisticated weapons and more sophisticated defence systems. 

This new nuclear arms race is creating a fallacy of a possibility to win a nuclear war and intensifies the illusion that deterrence works best when you have as much deterring capacity as possible and a powerful missile defence. As if there would be any possibility to defend yourself in a nuclear war.

All this increases the tension, and costs inconceivable amounts of money—money that is urgently needed to address global warming, the loss of biodiversity, healthcare, poverty, and other major social issues.

Military exercises with a nuclear component are also expanding. Recently, Finland took part for the first time in NATO’s Steadfast Noon exercise. Finnish fighters rehearsed shielding US bombers with (sham) nuclear weapons in an imaginary nuclear attack. This was justified by claiming that the exercise showed the strength of NATO’s deterring force. Officials also said it was  important for Finland to learn more about nuclear weapons and nuclear war.

This logic does not hold. NATO and Russia have already enough nuclear weapons to kill us all. Maintaining deterrence does not need more powerful destructive force or more sophisticated ways to deliver the bombs. And what shall Finland or anybody do with the knowledge of how to fight a nuclear war. If that happens, there will be no winners or losers. After any nuclear war most Finns will starve to death in a famine caused by nuclear winter regardless of where the bombs have been dropped. Why to rehearse a suicide?

Sometimes exercises and missile tests are said to be necessary  to make bombs, aircraft, and manoeuvrers safer and less prone to accidents. It is true that nuclear safety has increased during the last decades, which is of course a good thing as it diminishes the risk of unintentional nuclear explosions and launches.Nuclear security, however, has more to do with international politics and how the decision makers act. Will they negotiate and compromise or, rather, choose to demonstrate their own strength? How well does the communication between nuclear weapons states work? Do they share a common picture of the risks and is there any trust between them? 

Nuclear security is also affected by the number of nuclear warheads on constant alert and on the warfighting doctrines of the nuclear-weapon states. The US has a policy to launch missiles on warning and Russia’s current doctrine justifies the use of nuclear weapons if the sovereignty of the country is at stake. 

Nuclear security does not increase with nuclear tests or exercises. Nuclear saber-rattling merely provokes an adversary to add more sophisticated weapons to its own arsenal.  Building illusory defence systems creates a false feeling of security and may lead to dangerous attempts to bluff, which can go fatally wrong.

The only way to guarantee nuclear security is to abolish all nuclear weapons. As long as they exist, there Is a possibility of a nuclear war, unintentionally of by an uncontrollable escalation.

Before the abolition of nuclear weapons takes place, there are some things we can do to increase security and to diminish the risk. We need to decrease our dependency of nuclear weapons. Nuclear weapons should be taken off immediate alert. We should stop rehearsing for a nuclear war. Nuclear weapons states should commit to the no-first-use policy and declare they will never use them against non-nuclear states.  

We need dialogue and disarmament negotiations, not war-mongering.

Kati Juva is Co-President of IPPNW and coordinator of ICAN-Finland.